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Abstract 
This paper maps the US presidential terms with price dynamics in US stock markets by 
focusing on the S&P500 index. Fractional integration techniques, which are more general than 
other standard methods, are used and the results obtained produce interesting findings. It was 
found that during the second presidential terms, S&P500 stock market is less efficient and 
present higher degrees of persistence in its volatility. This is observed independently of the 
political affiliations of the president in power. The volatility, in general, reflects the spillover 
of economic excesses at the end of the first presidential term when seeking re-election into the 
second term in office. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies at the end of the first term 
may create disequilibria in the economy which are amplified in the second term through a 
transmission mechanism resulting in contractionary interventionist policies in a situation where 
no incentive for re-election exists by the incumbent. 
 
Key words: Democratic party; Fractional integration; Republican party; Stocks; US 
Presidential terms 
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1. Introduction 
It is of interest to observe and map fluctuations in stock prices to presidential terms since such 
fluctuations, causing cycles in businesses, are natural processes of changing consumer 
expectations. Many of such cycles, as documented in Hurst (1970) exist. The stock market is 
known to be the most sensitive indicator of the business cycles, and serves as the most 
influential variable in the government’s index of leading economic indicators (Bernstein, 1991; 
Sensier et al., 2004; Wong and McAleer, 2009).1 The Theory of the Presidential Election 
Cycle,2 which attempts to explain the relationship existing between presidential elections and 
stock prices, has led to several studies with interesting findings that have important policy 
implications. This is basically because of the belief that businesses tend to be more profitable 
in low tax regimes and under stable government policies. These features are often characterized 
by the ideologies of the government in power, which are likely to change every four years in 
election processes. According to the stock market hypothesis, upon election, a president may 
often try to introduce unpopular economic measures, which often involve cutting down on 
fiscal spending and/or contractionary monetary policy, thus inducing a deflationary phase in 
the business cycle. However, as the next election approaches, the incumbent president applies 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.  The argument is that, a strong economy in the first 
half of a president’s term serves no political role, owing to the short-term memories of voters. 
On the other hand, stimulating the economy prior to the presidential elections enhances the 
                                                          
1 Wong and McAleer (2009) documents six cyclical patterns that are likely to affect general pricing behaviours 
of commodities: the 28-day Trading Cycle also known as the Lunar Cycle, the 10.5-month Commodity Futures 
Cycle, the January Effect, the 4-year Cycle also known as the Kitchin Cycle/Presidential Election Cycle), the 9.2-
year Cycle also known as the Juglar Cycle and the 54-year Cycle also known as the Kondratieff Cycle. These 
cycles’ analysis is explained in Financial astrology which believes that Jupiter-Saturn cycle is being used in 
trading activities since Sun shifts periodically based on the positions and gravitational pulls of these heavy planets, 
which on the long run, causes change in weather and as well affect commodity prices. 
 
2 This presidential 4-year cycle is originally known as the Kitchen Wave cycle (Kitchin, 1923). The Proponent of 
the theory (Kitchin) noted a 40-month cycle existing in some financial variables in Great Britain and the USA 
between 1890 and 1922, particularly that US Presidential terms caused cyclical patterns in US stock prices from 
1868 to 1945. In practice, this 4-year cycle varies in length from 40 to 53 months (see Stovall, 1992).      
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chances of the incumbent party’s victory. A weak economy works strongly against an 
incumbent’s re-election. Consequently, the stock market, which is a leading indicator of 
economic activities is, therefore, expected to fall during the first two years after a presidential 
election and rise strongly during the two years prior to the next presidential election (Hoey, 
1978).  
Early empirical literature (for example, Niederhoffer et al. (1970) and Riley and 
Luksetich (1980)) find that increases in US stock market prices are associated with the election 
of Republican presidents, while decreases in the prices are often associated with the election 
of Democrats. The conclusion, however, is not supported by empirical evidence. Huang and 
Schlarbaum (1982), for example, found increase in stock market returns when Democrats were 
in power. Between the years 1928 and 2002, the US stock index had negative returns in just 
three election years, while returns were positive for the remaining election years (see Nickles, 
2004). Other studies have also tried to find macroeconomic explanations for the apparent 
relationships between stock market returns and politics. For instance, Stangl and Jacobsen 
(2007), basing their findings on individual company stocks, could not find stocks with higher 
market returns during Democratic rule than those observed during Republican rule. They, 
therefore, suggested that the explanation for their existence must be found at the 
macroeconomic level. Wong and McAleer (2009) found that US stock prices followed the four-
year presidential election cycle, in which prices of stock fell during the first half of a 
presidency, and rose to reach a peak at the end of the first four-year term. These authors 
reported that the pattern was maintained from as far back as the term of President Lyndon 
Johnson to the administration of President George W. Bush.  Wong and McAleer (2009) have 
further shown that the stock market prospers in the election year, given that policy makers tend 
to tread softly with respect to taxation issues, but thereafter, falls given the regime changes and 
plausible adoption of unpopular policies. Therefore, the pattern of stock price movement within 
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and across each four-year cycle (usually found to vary between 40 and 53 months) for a sitting 
US president is an important feature to be investigated. Although, factors that influence stock 
prices are complex to model, several more recent studies have shown some levels of 
dependencies of the US stocks (S&P500) on US presidential terms and election year, since 
1928. For example, Wang and Wong (2015) studied US stocks from 1927 to 2012 and found 
within that period, the existence of rational speculative bubbles under Republican presidents, 
whereas these are lacking under Democratic rulings. Colón-De-Armas et. al. (2017) examined 
shifts in investor’s sentiment in seven US presidential elections from 1988 to 2012, by means 
of closed-end funds discounts strategy. The results indicated that investor sentiment diminished 
within the two weeks to election period and persisted until a week after the election.  
In several studies of the four-year terms of US presidents, stock prices have generally 
been observed to fall, reaching a trough in the first half of a presidency, and reaching a peak in 
the third and fourth years (see Allivine and O’Neill, 1980; Huang, 1985; Stovall, 1992; Gartner 
and Wellershoff, 1995; Hensel and Ziemba, 1995; Booth and Booth, 2003; Nickles, 2004; 
Wong and McAleer, 2009; Egan, Yellin and Houp, 2019). Hinging on the observed pattern, 
stock market players are advised to invest during October of the second year of a presidential 
term and sell off the stocks in December of the fourth year. Generally, the US Presidential 
administrations have influenced performance of stocks, while Presidents Reagan, Clinton and 
Obama coincided S&P500 price index to increase by 118, 210 and 181 percent, respectively, 
in their two-term reigns (8 years), the stock index during the one 4 year term of President 
George H.W. Bush rose by 51 percent. However, in the case of President George W. Bush, the 
stock index fell by 37 percent within his eight-year period in office, and this fall started in the 
third year of his second four-year term (see Egan, Yellin and Houp, 2019). These presidents, 
who belong to different political parties have distinctive ideologies with respect to governance. 
Therefore, the persistence of US presidential terms/election cycle, alternating between the two 
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main political parties – the Democrats and the Republicans (see Huang, 1985), is however, 
more pronounced in the former than in the latter, and might have constituted some anomaly in 
the US stock market over the years. This, therefore, informs the need to investigate the extant 
relationship and/or pattern, which will be of immense interest the US government, portfolio 
managers and individuals. On the contrary, some studies (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003) not 
only found that the difference in returns were inexplicable by expected returns related to 
business cycle variables, but also, that these returns did not cluster around election dates. 
However, the debate on the possible influence of presidential elections or presidential cycles 
on stock markets remains a researchable area (see Goodell and Vahamaa, 2013; Shaikh, 2017; 
Shen et al., 2017 and Pham et al., 2018 among others). Scholars such as Bohl and Gottschalk 
(2006), however, argue that the Democratic premium and the four-year election cycle are not 
pervasive around the world and are, at best, limited to the U.S. and only a few other countries. 
The size and influence of the US in the global economy, however, makes it important to 
understand its economic performance. 
 By way of adopting more general techniques of fractional integration, in this present 
paper, the performance of stocks in the US was investigated, using time series analysis over 
several US presidential terms over a forty year period, incorporating aspects of stock market 
efficiency and volatility persistence with some degree of success. Using S&P500 as the main 
stock index representing the capital market of the US, fractional integration is applied to 
investigate the time property of the stock index over time (from January 1977 to March 2019), 
corresponding to the presidential terms of President Jimmy Carter up to President Donald 
Trump.  An important contribution of the analysis in this paper is to map stock price dynamics 
with US presidential terms, and determine whether there is a difference in the first and the 
second periods in power, in terms of market inefficiency and the persistence of volatility, and 
the extent to which these aspects, if at all, are affected by the president being a Republican or 
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a Democrat. Fractional integration techniques are very flexible in the analysis of time series 
data, and provide important insights relating to the degree of persistence inherent in the data. 
Moreover, market efficiency requires an order of integration equal to 1 for the stock market 
prices and departures from this assumption produces inefficiencies in the stock markets. No 
study so far has examined the issues of US presidential terms and their impact on the S&P500 
index using fractional integration techniques. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to discuss the 
statistical methods used in the paper. Section 3 presents the empirical results, while Section 4 
focuses on the interpretation of the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Statistical Methods 
The methodology used in the paper is based on fractional integration or  I d  techniques. 
However, before introducing this concept, there is a need to describe the integration of order 
0, or  0I  process.  A process  , 0, 1,tu t    is said to be integrated of order 0, and denoted 
as  0tu I  if it is a covariance stationary process with a spectral density function that is 
positive and bounded at all frequencies. This is usually considered as a minimal requirement 
to make statistical inference and includes the white noise model but also the classical stationary 
and invertible ARMA (AutoRegressive Moving Average) class of models.  
 On the other hand, many processes are nonstationary and require a number of 
differences (usually 1) to render them stationary  0I . If the number of differencing is one, 
the series is said to be  1I  or integrated of order 1, including here the random walk process 
and the  ,1,ARIMA p q  type of models. On some rare occasions, the series might be integrated 
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of order two, that is,  2I .2  The order of integration can also be fractional, which is the idea 
behind the fractional integration technique.  
  A time series  , 0, 1,tx t    is said to be integrated of order d , and denoted as 
 tx I d  if it can be represented as: 
,...,2,1,)1(  tuxL tt
d     (1) 
where L  is the lag operator (i.e., 1t tLx x  ) and tu  is  0I . Then, the polynomial on the left 
hand side in equation (1) can be expressed in terms of its binomial expansion, such that, for all 
real d , 
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Thus, if d  is a real value, tx  depends on all its past history, playing also a crucial role as an 
indicator of the degree of dependence of the series: the higher the value of d , the higher the 
level of association between the observations. Moreover, d  also plays a crucial role in the 
determination of the nature of the shocks, noting that if d  is smaller than 1, shocks will have 
a transitory nature contrary to what happens if 1d  , where shocks will be permanent. 
 This type of process was proposed in the 80s by Granger (1980, 1981), Granger and 
Joyeux (1980) and Hosking (1981). Though, it was not until the 90s that they appeared, for the 
first time, in the analysis of aggregate data (see Sowell, 1992; Baillie, 1996; Gil-Alana and 
Robinson, 1997; etc.). Since then, they have become very popular in economics and finance 
(see Michelacci and Zaffaroni, 2000; Mayoral, 2006; Christensen et al., 2010; Martins and 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Haldrup (1998), Juselius (2006), Juselius and Johansen (2006), etc. 
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Rodrigues, 2012; Gil-Alana and Moreno, 2012; Hassler et al., 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2015; 
Abbritti et al., 2016; Gil-Alana and Huijbens, 2018, among many others). 
 The differencing parameter d  is estimated in this paper by using the Whittle function 
in the frequency domain (Dahlhaus, 1989). In particular, a testing approach developed by 
Robinson (1994) which is very convenient, especially, in the context of nonstationary data is 
used. Robinson (1994) proposed a very general statistical method that tests for fractional orders 
of integration in time series. His set up is given in equation (2) below as  
,' ttt xzy       (2) 
where ty  represents the observed time series; tz  is a  1k   set of exogenous regressors or 
deterministic terms that might include, for example, an intercept, and/or an intercept with a 
time trend,   is a  1k   vector of unknown parameters, and the regressions errors  tx  are 
given by a general expression, that for the purpose of this work, is simplified and assumed to 
follow equation (1). Then, he proposed a test statistic of the null hypothesis: 
 ,: 0ddHo      (3) 
in the model given by (1) and (2) for any real value 0d .  In the context of efficiency of stock 
markets this hypothesis entails that prices always fully reflect the information available and no 
profit can be made from information based trading (Lo and MacKinley, 1999).  
 This method, whose specific form can be found in any of the numerous empirical 
applications (Gil-Alana and Robinson, 1997; Gil-Alana and Henry, 2003; etc.), has several 
advantages with respect to other methods. First, the fact that 0d  can be any real value, allows 
us to test nonstationary hypotheses (i.e., 0.5d  ), with no need of preliminary differencing, as 
is the case with other methods.3 Also, the limit distribution is standard normal, with no need 
                                                          
3 Lobato and Velasco (2007) proposed a Wald test with the same asymptotic distribution as in Robinson (1994); 
however, it requires a consistent estimate of d and thus, it is constrained to the stationary region (d < 0.5). 
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for the calculation of numerical values, as is the case in other unit root approaches. Moreover, 
this method is the most efficient one in the Pitman sense against local departures from the null. 
 
 
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
The data used in this paper are the daily closing values of Standard & Poors (S&P500) index 
of the United States, spanning between January 20, 1977 and March 1, 2019, covering the terms 
for seven presidents in which four of them spent two terms each. Table 1 summarizes the 
periods of ruling of these presidents, together with their political affiliations, either a Democrat 
or a Republican. Within the sampled period, the first president who ruled between 1977 and 
1981 was President Jimmy Carter (JC), while the current president is Donald Trump (DT), who 
has spent about 2 years out of his first 4-year term. Presidents Ronald Reagan (RR), Bill Clinton 
(BC), George W. Bush (GWB) and Barack Obama (BO), each spent two terms in office, and 
during the time of government, S&P500 market performed well, with positive returns in these 
administrations. For these four presidents, at the end of their 4-year term (either 1st or 2nd), 
stocks performed relatively better than during their first 2 years in the 4-year term, and this is 
independent of whether the president was a Republican or a Democrat. The 8-year period of 
President George W. Bush (GWB), a Republican, coincided with the 2008/09 global crisis, 
which emanated from the US and spread through integrated financial markets. Also, the 
government public policy strategy of this Republican president contributed to the overall 
negative returns in S&P500 index, in both the 1st and 2nd terms of his 4-year terms.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Here, the results in terms of the estimated values of d  are presented for the S&P500 
index, for each of the presidential periods. In all cases, the model given by the equations (2) 
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and (1) is considered, with tz  in (2) equal to  1, t   for t ≥ 1, (0, 0)’ otherwise. Thus, the tested 
model under (3) is: 
                       
,...,2,1,)1(,10  tuxLxty tt
d
tt
O   (4) 
for any range of values of 0d  from 0, …(0.01) to 2.  Both original and log-transformed data 
are used, and started with the assumption that the error term, tu  in (4) is a white noise process. 
Table 2 displays the results for the original data, while Table 3 refers to the results for log-
transformed values. The tables illustrate the estimated values of d  (along with the 95% 
confidence bands of the non-rejection values of d  using Robinson’s (1994) tests), under the 
three standard cases: i) no deterministic terms (i.e., 0 1 0    in (4)), ii) an intercept ( 1 0   
in (4)), and iii) an intercept with a linear time trend ( 0  and 1  unknown). The selected model 
for each series, based on the t-values of the estimated coefficients on the d -differenced series 
presented in the tables were marked in bold.  
 Starting with the original data (in Table 2), it is observed that the model with a time 
trend would be required in a number of cases (BC and BO during the two terms). However, for 
the rest of the periods, the model with intercept only seems to be sufficient to describe the 
deterministic terms. Focussing on the values of d , it is observed that most are around 1, 
implying efficiency in the market in the sense of Fama (1970)4 though, evidence of mean 
reversion (i.e., values of d  statistically smaller than 1) are obtained in a number of cases: BC 
during the second term; GWB during the second term; and BO in both 4-year terms. This 
evidence of mean reversion indicates that the null of 1d   is rejected in favour of 1d  , 
implying inefficiencies in the markets as the random walk hypothesis is rejected by the data.  
                                                          
4 According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), stock market prices should follow a random walk, 
implying an order of integration of 1 in the log price series. Following this theory, its weak form states that it is 
not possible to trade profitably on the basis of historical stock market prices and/or return information (see Fama, 
1970). 
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[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 Looking at the results for the log-transformed data (Table 3), the values are very similar, 
finding evidence of market inefficiencies in the same 4-year terms of BC, GWB and BO as 
before, along with RR again during the second 4-year term in power. 
 Next, the autocorrelated errors, 
tu  are accommodated. However, instead of using here 
a parametric ARMA model, which might produce multiple results, depending on the 
specification of the AR and MA orders, a non-parametric approach proposed by Bloomfield 
(1973) is selected. This method is called semi-parametric in the sense that it is not explicitly 
formulated but implicitly, in terms of its spectral density function, which is given by: 
               








  )
1
(cos2exp
2
2
);f(
m
r
r
r


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where m  indicates the number of short run components (which ranges from 1r   to a particular 
value m ), that is, the size of the truncated Fourier function,    = 3.142, r  are coefficients in 
the function, and tu   is an  0I  process with variance 
2 , while   gives the frequency in the 
truncated function. Bloomfield (1973) showed that this specification approximates, fairly well, 
the spectrum of highly parameterized ARMA models, thus producing autocorrelations that 
decay exponentially fast to zero. Moreover, this model is stationary across all values of   
unlike what happens in the ARMA case, and it accommodates extremely well, for 
autocorrelation in the context of fractional integration. (See Gil-Alana, 2004). The results in 
terms of the values of d , using Bloomfield (1973) for the error term are presented in Tables 4 
and 5. 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 Starting again with the original data (Table 4), the time trend is now required in the 
majority of the cases and mean reversion  1d   seems to occur in the following presidential 
periods (terms): RR, BC, GWB and BO, and in all cases, surprisingly, during the second term 
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in power. For the logged series (Table 5), this evidence is obtained precisely in the same 
presidential terms. Thus, it seems that markets become inefficient during the second 
presidential terms, and this happened in the case of both Democrat and Republican 
governments. This issue will be further elaborated in the next section.  
Now, we move to the volatility of the series, and we proxy this feature by using two 
measures: absolute and squared returns, obtained as the absolute and squared values of the first 
differenced log-S&P500 index.5 As with the levels, we start with the case of no autocorrelation 
(white noise) errors, and the results are presented in Tables 6 and 7, respectively, for the 
absolute and squared returns. It is observed that across these two tables, all the estimated values 
of d  are positive and significant, implying long memory patterns. These values range between 
0.05 (BC, 1st term) and 0.22 (RR, 2nd term, and DT) for the absolute values, and are slightly 
higher for the squared returns, ranging now between 0.12 (BC, 1st term) and 0.40 (GWB, 2nd 
term). 
 [Insert Tables 6 - 9 about here] 
 Allowing for autocorrelation, the results presented in Tables 8 and 9 are similar to the 
previous case. All the values are significantly positive (long memory) and range between 0.05 
and 0.24 with respect to the absolute returns, and between 0.07 and 0.42, for the squared 
returns. Generally, the periods of President George W. Bush (GWB) (2nd term) reported the 
highest volatility due to the global financial crisis that occurred during his second term, while 
the lowest volatility was reported, generally, in the period of President Ronald Reagan (1st 
term). The overall volatility result is not surprising, since this was something that was observed 
in most financial markets a long time ago (Ding, Granger and Engle, 1993). However, taking 
a critical look at the results, another interesting feature is observed; noting that the estimated 
                                                          
5 Absolute returns have been employed as proxy for the volatility in Ding et al. (1993), Granger and Ding (1996), 
Bollerslev and Wright (2000), Gil-Alana (2005), Sibbertsen (2004), Cotter (2005) and Yang and Perron (2010), 
among many others. On the other hand, squared returns are used in Lobato and Savin (1998), Blair et al. (2001), 
Cotter (2005), Patton (2011), Jondeau (2015), etc. 
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values of d  are generally greater during the second periods in power for each government. 
Thus, in the same way that we observe inefficiencies in the second terms, we also observe a 
higher degree of persistence in the volatility processes. These two features are critically 
investigated in the next section. 
 
4. Summary and Discussion 
The results presented in Table 10 and Table 11 are the summary of the results reported in 
Section 3, for the level and volatility series. Starting with the level series, in Table 10, the 
selected estimates of d  are presented for each period of government, in the results obtained 
across Tables 2 through 5. It is observed that in all the periods, where the incumbent president 
has been re-elected to office for a second time, there is a substantial reduction in the degree of 
integration during the second term, moving from potential efficiencies  1d   to inefficiencies 
and mean reversion  1d  . This happens in all the cases considered, although, during the 
administration of BO, the mean reversion is also observed in the first term, at least for the case 
of uncorrelated (white noise) errors. 
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here] 
 Focusing on the volatilities, Table 11 summarized the results reported across Tables 6 
through 9. The results are also interesting here, noting an increase in the degree of persistence 
in all except one case (BO with squared returns and autocorrelated errors). In all the other cases, 
the values of d  are higher during the second terms.  
 A vital hypothesis explaining increasing market inefficiency in the second term is that 
the interventionist expansionary policies aimed at achieving re-election at the end of the first 
term have now been transmitted more fully into the economy by the second term creating 
market inefficiencies. The adverse effects of these policies were not fully felt in the economy 
at the end of the first presidential term as their transmission takes time but these excesses now 
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adversely affect market efficiency and other aspects of economic performance more fully in 
the second term. In some cases, contractionary monetary and fiscal policies are employed in 
an attempt to put the economy back on track in the second term and these further deepen the 
economic challenges to be faced and contribute to higher volatility persistence in the second 
presidential term. The lack of concern with re-election in the second term may reduce the 
attempts to address the fundamental causes of the problem leading to quick-fix solutions that 
further exacerbate the economic challenges worsening market inefficiency and increasing 
volatility persistence. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The results obtained in this paper demonstrate that during the second legislature, the markets 
are more inefficient, in the sense that the differencing parameter, d, is found to be large but 
smaller than 1 in most of the cases during the second period in power but not during the first. 
This happens in both parties. Also, the persistence is higher in the volatilities in all cases during 
the second legislatures. Thus, markets are efficient at first, but after four years, of the same 
government in power, markets become inefficient and the persistence in the volatility increases. 
This implies that during the first term, prices are more reflective of all information and neither 
technical nor fundamental analysis can produce risk-adjusted excess returns.  Stocks trade at 
their fair value in stock exchanges making it more difficult for investors to purchase 
undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices. It is therefore difficult to outperform the 
overall market through expert stock selection or market timing and the only way an investor 
can obtain higher returns is by purchasing riskier investments. An explanation for this is that 
first term economic performance is likely to be more robust especially towards the end because 
of the focus on re-election. The focus on re-election at the end of the first term, however, creates 
fundamental market distortions through interventionist policies based on expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies to boost the economy. The negative economic effects of these 
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interventionist policies through a larger fiscal deficit and higher inflation, for example, carry 
over into the second presidential term. Additional policy interventions may be undertaken 
during the second term to deal with emerging problems from the original interventions that 
arose at the end of the first term. This trend magnifies and the distortions in the economy 
become more deeply embedded in the second term with less care about the adverse economic 
consequences as incumbents are not seeking re-election. Market efficiency is, therefore, eroded 
during the second term with technical or fundamental analysis and able to produce risk-adjusted 
excess returns. During the second term, stocks are more likely to be under or overvalued. This 
has important policy implications for investors and portfolio managers who can capitalise on 
buying undervalued stocks and selling overvalued stocks to beat the market in the second term. 
Attempts to beat the market are therefore more likely to succeed during the second term than 
during the first term when the market is more efficient. Volatility persistence also increases 
during the second term as the adverse consequences of economic excesses at the end of the 
first presidential term are now amplified. Attempts to deal with these problems through 
contractionary monetary and fiscal policies may contribute to an economic downturn with 
greater volatility as the second term proceeds. 
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Table 1: US Presidential terms 
Period Name Party Term First 2-year 
S&P500 
Performance 
(%) 
Full term 
S&P500 
Performance 
(%) 
20/01/1977-
19/01/1981 
Jimmy Carter 
(JC) 
Democratic 1st -3.2 30.5 
20/01/1981-
19/01/1985 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) 
Republican 1st 11.1 30.1 
20/01/1985-
19/01/1989 
Ronald Reagan  
(RR) 
Republican 2nd 53.5 63.7 
20/01/1989-
19/01/1993 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) 
Republican 1st 15.9 51.8 
20/01/1993-
19/01/1997 
Bill Clinton (BC) 
Democratic 1st 7.2 79.1 
20/01/1997-
19/01/2001 
Bill Clinton (BC) 
Democratic 2nd 61.8 72.9 
20/01/2001-
19/01/2005 
George W Bush 
(GWB) 
Republican 1st -33.9 -11.8 
20/01/2005-
19/01/2009 
George W Bush 
(GWB) 
Republican 2nd 21.7 -27.7 
20/01/2009-
19/01/2013 
Barack Obama 
(BO) 
Democratic 1st 61.2 84.5 
20/01/2013-
19/01/2017 
Barack Obama 
(BO) 
Democratic 2nd 35.5 51.7 
20/01/2017-
1/03/2019 
Donald Trump 
(DT) 
Republican 1st 17.6 ---- 
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Figure 1: Plots of S&P Stocks by US Presidential terms 
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Table 2: Estimates of d  for each series under no autocorrelation (Original series) 
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time 
trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 1.00 (0.96, 1.06) 1.09 (1.06, 1.15) 1.10 (1.06, 1.15) 
Ronald Reagan (RR) 
--- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 1.04 (1.00, 1.10) 1.04 (1.00, 1.10) 
Ronald Reagan (RR) 
--- 2nd term 
Republican 1.01 (0.96, 1.05) 1.00 (0.95, 1.05) 1.00 (0.95, 1.05) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.96, 1.04) 1.00 (0.95, 1.05) 1.00 (0.95, 1.05) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --- 
1st term 
Democratic 1.02 (0.97, 1.06) 1.04 (0.99, 1.08) 1.04 (0.99, 1.08) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --- 
2nd term 
Democratic 0.97 (0.94, 1.03) 0.93 (0.88, 0.99) 0.93* (0.88, 0.99) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 0.98 (0.94, 1.03) 0.98 (0.94, 1.03) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.97 (0.93, 1.02) 0.89*(0.86, 0.93) 0.89 (0.86, 0.93) 
Barack Obama (BO) 
--- 1st term 
Democratic 1.01 (0.96, 1.06) 0.93 (0.89, 0.98) 0.93* (0.89, 0.98) 
Barack Obama (BO) 
--- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.99 (0.95, 1.04) 0.92 (0.90, 0.99) 0.92* (0.90, 0.99) 
Donald Trump (DT) 
--- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.94, 1.06) 0.97 (0.91, 1.03) 0.97 (0.91, 1.03) 
*: Evidence of mean reversion at the 95% level. 
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Table 3: Estimates of d  for each series under no autocorrelation (in logs)  
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time 
trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) -
-- 1st term 
Democratic 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 1.09 (1.04, 1.13) 1.09 (1.04, 1.13) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.96, 1.04) 1.05 (1.01, 1.09) 1.05 (1.01, 1.09) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 2nd term 
Republican 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 0.96*(0.94, 0.99) 0.98 (0.94, 1.03) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) -- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.96, 1.04) 1.00 (0.96, 1.06) 1.00 (0.96, 1.06) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 1.02 (0.97, 1.07) 1.02 (0.97, 1.07) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 2nd term 
Democratic 1.00 (0.96, 1.04) 0.93 (0.89, 0.99) 0.93* (0.89, 0.99) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.96, 1.04) 0.98 (0.93, 1.02) 0.98 (0.93, 1.02) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.99 (0.96, 1.04) 0.88*(0.85, 0.92) 0.88 (0.85, 0.92) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 1st term 
Democratic 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 0.93 (0.89, 0.98) 0.93* (0.89, 0.98) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 2nd term 
Democratic 1.00 (0.95, 1.04) 0.93 (0.90, 0.99) 0.93* (0.90, 0.99) 
Donald Trump (DT) 
--- 1st term 
Republican 0.99 (0.94, 1.06) 0.96 (0.90, 1.03) 0.96 (0.90, 1.03) 
*: Evidence of mean reversion at the 95% level. 
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Table 4: Estimates of d  for each series under (Bloomfield) autocorrelation (Original 
series) 
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time 
trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) 
--- 1st term 
Democratic 0.98 (0.92, 1.07) 0.98 (0.92, 1.07) 0.98 (0.92, 1.07) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.98 (0.92, 1.06) 0.99 (0.92, 1.06) 0.99 (0.92, 1.06) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.99 (0.92, 1.06) 0.91 (0.85, 0.97) 0.91* (0.85, 0.97) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) -- 1st term 
Republican 1.01 (0.94, 1.08) 0.94 (0.87, 1.03) 0.94 (0.87, 1.03) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 1.01 (0.94, 1.08) 0.95 (0.89, 1.03) 0.95 (0.89, 1.03) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.97 (0.90, 1.04) 0.86 (0.79, 0.92) 0.86* (0.80, 0.92) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 0.97 (0.91, 1.04) 0.97 (0.91, 1.04) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.97 (0.93, 1.02) 0.95*(0.91, 0.99) 0.95 (0.91, 0.99) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 1st term 
Democratic 1.01 (0.96, 1.06) 0.94 (0.86, 1.02) 0.94 (0.87, 1.02) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.99 (0.95, 1.04) 0.88 (0.77, 0.98) 0.88* (0.78, 0.98) 
Donald Trump 
(DT) --- 1st term 
Republican 1.00 (0.94, 1.06) 0.94 (0.84, 1.06) 0.94 (0.84, 1.06) 
*: Evidence of mean reversion at the 95% level. 
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Table 5: Estimates of d  for each series under (Bloomfield) autocorrelation (in logs) 
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time 
trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) 
--- 1st term 
Democratic 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 1.00 (0.94, 1.07) 1.00 (0.94, 1.07) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 1.00 (0.94, 1.08) 1.00 (0.94, 1.08) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 0.89 (0.81, 0.95) 0.89* (0.81, 0.95) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) -- 1st term 
Republican 0.99 (0.93, 1.06) 0.95 (0.88, 1.02) 0.95 (0.88, 1.02) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 0.93 (0.88, 1.02) 0.93 (0.88, 1.02) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 0.87 (0.79, 0.95) 0.87* (0.79, 0.95) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 0.97 (0.92, 1.05) 0.97 (0.92, 1.05) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.98 (0.92, 1.06) 0.93*(0.88, 0.98) 0.93 (0.88, 0.98) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 1st term 
Democratic 0.98 (0.92, 1.06) 0.96 (0.88, 1.04) 0.96 (0.88, 1.04) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.99 (0.93, 1.07) 0.89 (0.79, 0.97) 0.90* (0.79, 0.97) 
Donald Trump 
(DT) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.98 (0.90, 1.06) 0.94 (0.84, 1.06) 0.94 (0.84, 1.06) 
*: Evidence of mean reversion at the 95% level. 
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Table 6: Estimates of d  for each absolute returns series under no autocorrelation 
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) 
--- 1st term 
Democratic 0.10 (0.07, 0.13) 0.12 (0.09, 0.15) 0.07 (0.04, 0.12) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.08 (0.05, 0.12) 0.07 (0.05, 0.11) 0.07 (0.04, 0.10) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.22 (0.18, 0.26) 0.22 (0.19, 0.26) 0.22 (0.18, 0.26) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) -- 1st term 
Republican 0.11 (0.08, 0.15) 0.10 (0.07, 0.14) 0.09 (0.06, 0.13) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 0.06 (0.03, 0.10) 0.06 (0.03, 0.10) 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.10 (0.07, 0.15) 0.11 (0.08, 0.15) 0.10 (0.07, 0.14) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.19 (0.17, 0.22) 0.17 (0.14, 0.20) 0.14 (0.12, 0.18) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.23 (0.21, 0.25) 0.24 (0.22, 0.27) 0.21 (0.18, 0.23) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 1st term 
Democratic 0.19 (0.16, 0.21) 0.16 (0.13, 0.18) 0.15 (0.12, 0.18) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.21 (0.18, 0.26) 0.21 (0.17, 0.25) 0.21 (0.17, 0.25) 
Donald Trump 
(DT) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.23 (0.18, 0.28) 0.24 (0.20, 0.29) 0.22 (0.17, 0.27) 
In bold indicates the selected model as in equation (2) 
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Table 7: Estimates of d  for each absolute returns series under autocorrelation 
(Bloomfield) 
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) -
-- 1st term 
Democratic 0.13 (0.09, 0.18) 0.17 (0.12, 0.21) 0.10 (0.06, 0.16) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.18 (0.13, 0.23) 0.15 (0.10, 0.20) 0.14 (0.09, 0.19) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.32 (0.26, 0.40) 0.33 (0.27, 0.40) 0.32 (0.26, 0.40) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) -- 1st term 
Republican 0.18 (0.13, 0.25) 0.16 (0.11, 0.21) 0.15 (0.09, 0.21) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 0.16 (0.10, 0.23) 0.14 (0.10, 0.20) 0.12 (0.06, 0.19) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.17 (0.11, 0.24) 0.18 (0.11, 0.23) 0.17 (0.11, 0.23) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.40 (0.34, 0.46) 0.35 (0.29, 0.40) 0.32 (0.26, 0.38) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.42 (0.38, 0.46) 0.43 (0.39, 0.47) 0.40 (0.36, 0.45) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 1st term 
Democratic 0.42 (0.37, 0.49) 0.36 (0.31, 0.42) 0.37 (0.31, 0.43) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.33 (0.24, 0.39) 0.30 (0.24, 0.39) 0.30 (0.24, 0.39) 
Donald Trump (DT) 
--- 1st term 
Republican 0.28 (0.22, 0.37) 0.31 (0.25, 0.40) 0.27 (0.20, 0.37) 
In bold indicates the selected model as in equation (2) 
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Table 8: Estimates of d  for each squared returns series under no autocorrelation 
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) 
--- 1st term 
Democratic 0.10 (0.07, 0.14) 0.11 (0.08, 0.15) 0.07 (0.04, 0.12) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.10 (0.07, 0.13) 0.10 (0.07, 0.13) 0.09 (0.06, 0.13) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.12 (0.08, 0.16) 0.12 (0.08, 0.16) 0.12 (0.08, 0.16) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) -- 1st term 
Republican 0.10 (0.06, 0.14) 0.10 (0.06, 0.14) 0.09 (0.05, 0.14) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 0.06 (0.02, 0.09) 0.05 (0.01, 0.09) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.15 (0.11, 0.20) 0.15 (0.11, 0.20) 0.15 (0.11, 0.20) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.18 (0.15, 0.21) 0.17 (0.15, 0.20) 0.16 (0.13, 0.19) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.20 (0.18, 0.23) 0.20 (0.18, 0.24) 0.18 (0.16, 0.21) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 1st term 
Democratic 0.17 (0.14, 0.20) 0.16 (0.13, 0.19) 0.16 (0.13, 0.18) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.24 (0.21, 0.29) 0.24 (0.21, 0.29) 0.24 (0.21, 0.29) 
Donald Trump 
(DT) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.21 (0.16, 0.27) 0.22 (0.17, 0.27) 0.20 (0.15, 0.26) 
In bold indicates the selected model as in equation (2) 
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Table 9: Estimates of d  for each squared returns series under autocorrelation 
(Bloomfield) 
Presidential term Party No terms An intercept A linear time trend 
Jimmy Carter (JC) 
--- 1st term 
Democratic 0.11 (0.08, 0.16) 0.14 (0.09, 0.18) 0.07 (0.02, 0.13) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.18 (0.14, 0.24) 0.18 (0.14, 0.23) 0.18 (0.13, 0.23) 
Ronald Reagan 
(RR) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.19 (0.11, 0.26) 0.19 (0.11, 0.26) 0.19 (0.11, 0.25) 
George HW Bush 
(GHWB) -- 1st term 
Republican 0.10 (0.04, 0.16) 0.10 (0.04, 0.16) 0.09 (0.04, 0.16) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 1st term 
Democratic 0.12 (0.07, 0.19) 0.12 (0.07, 0.19) 0.11 (0.06, 0.18) 
Bill Clinton (BC) --
- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.12 (0.06, 0.20) 0.15 (0.07, 0.23) 0.15 (0.06, 0.24) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.41 (0.35, 0.48) 0.39 (0.33, 0.47) 0.38 (0.31, 0.45) 
George W Bush 
(GWB) --- 2nd term 
Republican 0.41 (0.37, 0.45) 0.43 (0.36, 0.46) 0.43 (0.35, 0.47) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 1st term 
Democratic 0.37 (0.32, 0.44) 0.34 (0.29, 0.40) 0.35 (0.29, 0.43) 
Barack Obama 
(BO) --- 2nd term 
Democratic 0.32 (0.25, 0.42) 0.36 (0.27, 0.44) 0.36 (0.27, 0.44) 
Donald Trump 
(DT) --- 1st term 
Republican 0.22 (0.15, 0.31) 0.24 (0.16, 0.33) 0.20 (0.12, 0.30) 
In bold indicates the selected model as in equation (2) 
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Table 10: Estimated values of d  on the levels depending on the party 
Democrats 
 
Period 
 
President 
White noise errors Autocorrelated errors 
Original Log values Original Log values 
1977 – 1981 Jimmy Carter 1.09 1.09 0.98 1.00 
      1993 – 1997  
Bill Clinton 
1.04 1.02 0.95 0.93 
1997 – 2001 0.93* 0.93* 0.86* 0.87* 
      2009 – 2013  
Barack 
Obama 
0.93* 0.93* 0.94 0.96 
2013 – 2017 0.91* 0.95* 0.88* 0.90* 
  Republicans 
 
Period 
 
President 
  White noise errors Autocorrelated errors 
Original Log values Original Log values 
1981 – 1985 Ronald 
Reagan 
1.04 1.05 0.99 1.00 
1985 – 1989 1.00 0.96* 0.91* 0.89* 
      1989 – 1993 GHW Bush 1.00 1,00 0.94 0.95 
      2001 – 2005  
GW Bush 
0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 
2005 – 2009 0.89* 0.88* 0.95* 0.93* 
      2017 – 2019 D. Trump 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.94 
*: Evidence of mean reversion  1d   at the 5% level. 
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Table 11: Estimated values of d  on the volatility depending on the party 
Democrats 
 
Period 
 
President 
White noise errors Autocorrelated errors 
Abs. returns Sqr. returns Abs. returns Sqr. returns 
1977 – 1981 Jimmy Carter 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 
  0.05    1993 – 1997  
Bill Clinton 
0.05 0.05 0.12 0.12 
1997 – 2001 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.15 
      2009 – 2013  
Barack 
Obama 
0.15 0.16 0.35 0.35 
2013 – 2017 0.21 0.24 0.36 0.33 
Republicans 
 
Period 
 
President 
White noise errors Autocorrelated errors 
Abs. returns Sqr. returns Abs. returns Sqr. returns 
1981 – 1985 Ronald 
Reagan 
0.07 0.10 0.15 0.18 
1985 – 1989 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.19 
  0.09   0. 
0.10 
1989 – 1993 GHW Bush 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.10 
      2001 – 2005  
GW Bush 
0.14 0.16 0.35 0.39 
2005 – 2009 0.21 0.18 0.40 0.43 
      2017 – 2019 D. Trump 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.20 
In bold, evidence of an increase in the persistence of the volatility during the second legislature. 
 
  
 
 
